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Commentary

THE HIGH PrucE OF llABrrAT PRomcnoN
Under the new Spedes At Risk Ad, the federal government would compensate landowners
whose property values are reduced by habitat protection orders. This is a very bad idea.
STEPAN

Woon

hortly after the new session of Parliament began in January
2001, the Liberal government introduced a new endangered
species bill to replace the one that died with the fall 2000 federal election. 1 Committee hearings were held through the spring,
and it was expected that the bill would be reported back to the
House of Co=ons in early su=er and enacted shortly afterward.
Critics have identified many flaws in the proposed Species at Risk
Act(SARA), but one alarming feature has been largely overlooked:
the legislation proposes to compensate landowners if mandatory
habitat protection orders reduce the value of their land. Such orders would be issued when private stewardship and economic incentives fail to protect critical wildlife habitat. As the government
explained in December 1999:

S

If the use of one's land has to be highly restricted by the use of the federal
habitat safety net to protect species' habitats, then individuals should be able
to apply for compensation?

This proposal is found in section 64 of the current bill, which
authorizes the federal Minister of the Environment to "provide
compensation to any person for losses suffered as a result of any
extraordinary impact of the application" of SARA's critical habitat protection provisions.
Proponents of compensation argue that critical habitat protection measures imposed by the government might drive already beleaguered family farmers and other vulnerable individuals out of
business and possibly out of house and home. 3 Clearly nobody
wants this result. In addition, proponents argue that American experience shows that enforcement of endangered species legislation
without compensation may give landowners a perverse incentive
to destroy wildlife habitat before it is discovered by the authorities.' This, too, is a result that everyone agrees should be avoided.
Nonetheless, leaping from these extreme cases to a general rule
that landowners and possibly holders of timber leases or mineral
licenses on federal land are entitled to compensation whenever
habitat protection laws cause them business losses or reduce the
market value of their land would be unprecedented in Canadian
law. Moreover it would be unjustified.
The general rule in Canada is that there must be an actual taking of property by the state or deprivation of its entire reasonable
economic value, before a right to compensation is triggered; there
is generally no right to compensation for laws or government actions simply because they severely restrict the uses to which property may be put, reduce its market value or limit (or even freeze)
its development. 5 A wide range of federal, provincial and municipal laws severely restrict land use, but do not normally give rise
to a right to compensation: for example, prohibitions on disturbing fish habitat or archaeological sites, restrictions on logging or
farming in riparian buffer zones, regulation of industrial air and
water pollution, and municipal zoning by-laws. Under Canadian
law, property owners do not have a right to be paid to comply with
validly enacted laws that affect the market value of their property.6

Proponents of the compensation proposal argue that government regulation that reduces property values may amount to a
"regulatory taking" of property that must be compensated out of
taxpayers' wallets. This argument has been used by property rights
advocates and industry groups in the United States to attack a
broad range of government measures relating to health, safety, social welfare and environmental protection. Some courts in the
United States have used the regulatory takings doctrine to invalidate, or order compensation for, municipal land-use planning decisions and state and federal measures to protect environmentally
sensitive areas such as wetlands and endangered species habitat.
Not surprisingly, the regulatory takings movement has generated furious controversy in the United States. 7 If the status of the
regulatory takings doctrine is doubtful in a country where private
property is constitutionally protected against government takings,
it should be even more so in Canada where we have consciously
decided against constitutional entrenchment of private property
rights. Indeed, the "regulatory taking" argument has been raised
infrequently before Canadian courts and has not met with much
success. 8
Even the federal government's own expert consultant expressly
recognizes that the compensation proposal is a radical departure
from past practice. Noted economist Peter Pearse, in his February
2001 report on compensation, states very clearly that:
[T]he courts and governments have historically drawn a distinction between
expropriation of property, for which compensation is due, and restrictions
on the use of property for some public purpose, for whjch compensation is
generally not payable. Restrictions that might be imposed under the Species at RiskAct are of this regulatory type, so compensation for them conflicts
with long established policy in Canada.9

Strangely, very few voices have been raised in opposition to the
federal government's compensation proposal. Indeed, some
prominent conservation groups have refused to condemn the proposal, possibly because they do not fully appreciate its implica-
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If the funds earmarked for compensation
were redirected to incentives and assistance,
the resulting benefits to endangered species
could be substantially enhanced.
tions. Yet the proposal is highly problematic for several reasons.
• First, the proposal is the thin end of a very large wedge. H the
government acknowledges an entitlement to compensation for
mandatory wildlife habitat protection measures, why not for
other government measures that affect property values, such as
mining and forestry regulations, municipal down-zoning, or the
introduction of controls on agricultural waste such as the manure
that contaminated Walkerton's drinking water supply with the
e. colibacteria? Governments have not recognized a right to compensation for such injuries in the past. H they now acknowledge
a property owner's entitlement to compensation for habitat protection, it will become increasingly difficult to refuse to compensate these other "injuries."
• Second, the proposal to compensate landowners reduces landowners' incentives to agree to co-operative stewardship arrangements with the government. A guarantee of compensation in the
event of failure of co-operative arrangements markedly improves
the landowner's bargaining position. If the unco-operative landowner is left as well off after a habitat protection order is issued
as he or she was before, the incentive to co-operate is reduced
and the government will have to offer more incentives to achieve
a negotiated resolution. Unless stewardship incentives equal or
exceed the anticipated compensation, a rational landowner may
well refuse to co-operate. Thus the compensation proposal has
the potential to undermine the very goal of the act: protection
of endangered species habitat through voluntary stewardship arrangements.
• Third, the proposal reflects the general view that wildlife habitat protection will usually reduce property values. This view is
based on a conception of "value" that largely disregards the value
of things for which there are no markets, such as habitat and
biodiversity. Moreover it ignores the possibility that restrictions
on land use may, in fact, iTllTeasethe market value of certain properties. In fact, land use restrictions created by legal tools like covenants and easements often enhance the value and marketability of land by protecting a business from competition, ensuring
the performance of services beneficial to property owners, or enhancing the aesthetic appeal of a property. The same can be said
of many municipal zoning restrictions: the value of your home
is increased by the assurance, provided by zoning bylaws, that
a parking lot, factory or big box store will not be built next door.
• Fourth, why should the taxpayers compensate individuals or
businesses for the cost of habitat protection measures when we
do not compensate other people for similar costs? The role of
elected representatives is to make decisions that apply generally
to the electorate. These decisions necessarily benefit some interests and harm others. That is the business of government. Governments regularly enact regulations or issue permits that legally
authorize industry to release harmful pollutants into the environment, but they do not generally offer to compensate members
of the public whose health is thereby harmed or put at risk (although some argue they should; my point is that government
policy should at least be consistent in this area). If governments
routinely make decisions that harm some individuals for the
purported greater good of society, why should property owners
10
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whose land is designated for habitat protection be singled out for
favourable treatment?
• Finally, even if we accept the argument that landowners should
be compensated with taxpayers' money for reductions in property value caused by government action, doesn't it follow that we
should send them a bill when government action causes the value
of their property to increase? When governments provide infrastructure works like a massive sewer main or highway connecting a semi-rural hinterland to an urban metropolis, property values in the area tend to rise. Governments do not require benefited
property owners to compensate the taxpayers for this increase in
value.
When a government establishes a park or protected area, should
the neighbouring landowners who benefit from the aesthetic
beauty of unspoiled nature and the assurance that their gorgeous
backyard view will not be turned into a subdivision pay for the
resulting increase in their property value ? Conversely, when a
province dismantles environmental protection regulations in order to signal that it is "open for business," should companies be
asked to reimburse the public for the benefits reaped from lower
regulatory compliance costs? There is no principled basis on
which to compensate owners for the burdens of government action, yet allow them to keep the benefits of government action (or
inaction) as a windfall.
So what should be done? We should protect farming families
and other vulnerable parties from genuine hardship occasioned
by endangered species habitat protection measures without recognizing a legal principle of compensation for reductions in prop·
erty or business value due to government action. This could be
done by offering greater stewardship incentives to landowners
severely disadvantaged by habitat protection requirements, along
with technical and financial assistance to switch to alternative land
uses. H the funds earmarked for compensation were redirected to
incentives and assistance, the resulting benefits to endangered
species could be substantially enhanced (in part by avoiding the
perverse bargaining incentives discussed above). Finally, some
funds should be set aside to compensate, on an ad hoc basis, landowners and their families who suffer severe hardship. But the op·
erative principle would be avoidance of genuine personal hardship, not compensation for reduced profitability.
It would be best to remove the compensation principle from the
act itself, but this may not be possible. Nonetheless, the legislation
is drafted in such a way that these restrictions could still be
achieved in the design and implementation of a compensation
program, and the federal government has hinted that it might be
open to such ideas. 10
It is odd that there has not been more controversy over this is·
sue. Before the federal goven'unent puts in place a system to com·
pensate landowners for the effects of critical habitat protection
orders, we should consider the serious implications this would
have for the whole range of public health, safety, welfare and environmental protection regulation. H we acknowledge a right to
compensation in this situation, it will not be long before landowners and industry demand compensation every time governments
tighten environmental protection laws or restrict the development
of environmentally significant areas.
!:'!

Stepan Wood is an assistant professor at Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, Toronto, Ontario.
NOTES
1
Bill C-5, an act respecting the protection of wildlife species at risk in Canada (first
reading February 2, 2001 ), available online at: < www.parl.gc.ca/37/ l/ parlbus/
chambus/ho use/bills/government/C-5/C-5_1/C-5_cover-E.htmJ> (accessed April 19,
2001 ). The federal government has established a Web site devoted to the SpeciesAt /UsJ:.
Ac4 <www.cws-scf.ec.gc.ca/sar/main.ht:m>.

